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ST\TFMENTOFJlTR:
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- V

• *• over the district court 5 orders pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78A-3-102(j) because the\ are orders over which the Court of \ppcals KUK* \UK
have original appellate jurisdiction
;•

• -i - hMR

i:;. »

. .» wai *r

ru-^

~ -(jo. Record on Appeal ("Rec") at 1278.
STA I'EMFNT O F T H E ISSUES

1.

Courts ,

•: •

= 1.: .1 i . 1. «.

. * ; * vognized a tort for spoliation of

r\ i . l n . i- have required that, as one of the key elements of the tort, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that liability in the underlying cause of action w as u\ MI *i
to ti.e ailegeu;

^ v i : i*.-,

.;

;

- .-IM

*• e

hahilr- in the underlying suit is not in

qiicstion because Skyline, the electrical company that installed the equipment, has
admitted liability and the only issue remaining in u-.

• i:. niiL . •

•• * ^

Does the loil ul spolialioii nl c\ idm<v r\ en if recognized by this Court, not aopK i

:

he

circumstances of this case because any alleged spoliatioi 1 did not prevent plaintills 1mm
establishing liability in the underlying case?
2.

1 hi'., ' (111! Ill J most olher states, has never recognized a tort for spoliation

of evidence. A spoliation tort would burden Utah courts with ongoing litigation, conflict
with the doctrines of res judicata and ^v-L.uciai , •. .

>

r•

!t(

•,. s

oic^ent

- 'i.wius that the tort seeks to pre\ ent. Should this i ourt reject

plaintiffs' invitation to create a new tort of spoliation of evidence?
3.
a

I JPS, in investigating tne ace**.

m^ puiM.» '

• -'^il '•<

-

1

-: •• *

was

ib an employer as required by the Utah OSH Act.

1

Does the dual capacity doctrine, even if adopted by Utah, not apply to this case because
UPS' obligations regarding the accident scene were related to its role as employer?
4.

Workers' compensation exclusivity reflects a bargain between employer

and employee regarding compensation for workplace related accidents. The dual
capacity doctrine, which Utah has not recognized, states that an employer acting in an
unrelated capacity cannot claim workers' compensation exclusivity and the doctrine
therefore conflicts with the bargain made for workers' compensation. Should this Court
refuse to recognize the dual capacity doctrine?
5.

Utah's Workers' Compensation Act does not apply to acts with a conscious

and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. Plaintiffs' complaint
does not allege that defendant UPS had a conscious and deliberate intent to inflict injury
on the decedent. Does the Utah Workers' Compensation Act exclude a plaintiff from
bringing a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence against his employer under these
circumstances even if such a tort is recognized by the Court?
6.

Punitive damages cannot stand alone, but must be attached to a cause of

action. If this Court does not recognize a spoliation tort, should it dismiss plaintiffs'
stand alone claim for punitive damages?
7.

Allowing punitive damages without fair notice to the party runs afoul of

federal and Utah constitutional guarantees of due process. The tort of spoliation has
never been recognized in the State of Utah. If Utah recognizes a spoliation tort, should
punitive damages not be allowed in this case because defendants did not have notice of
the potential for punitive damages at the time the alleged spoliation occurred?
2

STANDAltil OI< I t R if >
"
1 *• - i*rt"i\ irMit

:

pimiitiffs complaint must be determined by the facts pleaded

rather than the conclusions stated. See Franco v. The Church <>/,A WM * '/*/ :<day Saints. . i -

*

^ ..-

u 1111111 i 1111 ( , i s i 111" , 1111

-/,-

*•< * i, -, d, j . u m plaintiffs'
• iders ail reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in

a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Set id. at 200. 1 he uiMrict court'N eouu-. -'-OILS uf
law are reviewed under a . - r . v j m s

i--

• ^ H. r

f

\ *; Cu. v. Si. Benedict's

Hasp. Ill I r M I'M. I 9^ (Utah 1991 j . Also, "an appellate court mav a ffirm the
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground ,-\ UKV>I_* .jpp.>
record

m/,.* . •> navies. - -

" ' J'^

.

« '

.*

-, p;u: lipoma v. McPhie,

' ^ - < tah 2001) (emphasis omitted)).
^TERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL,
STATUTORY, AND RFCULATORY PROVT^n > ^

Workers' Compensation Act, Lull Code Ann. c M \ - J iuS( l j states, in relevant
part:
I ne ngiu to ieco\n LWIUJKHVUM- i*tn -UJ:- .. • uis chapter for miuries
sustained by an employee, \\heilk. \ chatting in death or not, i> the
L \clusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
•'••• • er imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil
; whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next ol kin. heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on
account of any accident or injury or death, in an\ way contracted, sustained,
, a\ ated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee
of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee—Mark Hills—who died in an
electrical accident while performing his work at a UPS site on August 19, 2003. Rec. 127. In a separate lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of an electrical contractor,
Skyline Electric Company ("Skyline"), led to this tragic accident. See Hills v. Skyline
Electric Co,, Civil Action No. 040107128 (Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, West Jordan Division) (October 14, 2004) ("Hills F). Rec. 631-37. After
a period of discovery, Skyline amended its answer to the Hills I complaint to admit
liability for the accident. Rec. 1084-88.
Plaintiffs filed this current lawsuit ("Hills IF) against UPS, Liberty Mutual (UPS'
workers' compensation insurance carrier), and Skyline on August 16, 2005, alleging
tortious interference, intentional misconduct, and negligence. Rec. 1-27. Skyline also
filed a cross claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual for spoliation. Rec. 159-93. The
gravamen of each of these claims is the allegation that defendants lost a wall anchor piece
relevant to the cause of the electrical accident (Compl. Tftj 34-36 (Rec. 7-8); PL Br. 9) in
the course of their accident investigation.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Hills II complaint and the district court held a
hearing on those motions on March 31, 2008. Rec. 719-24 (motions), 1282 (hearing).
On June 12, 2008, the district court granted those motions in part, dismissing Skyline's
cross claim with prejudice, dismissing plaintiffs' claim for negligence with prejudice, and
dismissing parts of the intentional misconduct and tortious interference claims with
prejudice. Rec. 1177-79.
4

The district court, also ordered supplemental briefing on "whether, given Plaintiffs'
Hills IIComplaint and :>k> im*. i JLLi:.
\ i mil I hr ctifitltil t<i .v.u.'i

;

*

:

>laintiffs

:ider their remaining damage claims under tornou*

interference and intentional misconduct Rec. 790-9? !* ^ supplemental bnc!
filed, another hearing wa^ iu ki c u scpt^
i' * *

^

September 9 the

!t\ ision that dismissed all ot plaintiffs" remaining claims because

Skyline's admission of liability had mooted any spoliation claim, plain? i«-* u
the elements of abu:>e oi precox a;<u i

-

\* - -

•. j *

t

vorkers'compensation

• * 1-40.
f Mamtil'N appealed the decision of the district court on Septemt\ i: . - . :
1248-st). • M. aoher.

^

•

•* •

^ :.

--peal on its docket. Rec.

STATEMENT o
Milk I nil , is fi f ot 11 M i employee of UPS. While at work earl} m the morning on
August 19, 2003 at a UPS Mobile Distribution Unit, 1lills was electrocutea \\. :,
attempting to retrieve a package tl MI I k:.,.
(Ret

"' i

I

••-

, u ,*. 14,12

ills «i |HI inr to the accident, Skyline had reinstalled a iiehi fixture in UK

unit where Hills worked, L;

r

°S (Rec. ^) In the hours immediateh • illow nit1 tin

accident, in the interest o: . s.- .: ^ .
p - •. • ^ •

• •. •

UJ skyline conducted

^ < oi Miioiib into the cause of the accident /</. <f 4 2 4 4 (Rec. 0-10) The

next da}, UPi and 1 iberu Mutual authorized Heath 1 lectin.al I ngmeenng
post-accident investigation mi. > m.

.^- ^i ^ '

5

« * * - • • •!

A . IU-«I;.

The Utah Occupational and Safety Health Division of the Labor Commission
("UOSH") conducted an investigation of the accident and, on January 17, 2004, issued a
citation to UPS for violating Utah Administrative Code R614-1-5.C.2, which states:
"Tools, equipment, materials or other evidence that might pertain to the cause of such
accident shall not be removed or destroyed until so authorized by the Labor Commission
or one of its Compliance Officers." UPS contested the citation, which resulted in a
settlement agreement with UOSH on November 30, 2004. That settlement agreement
reduced the fine from $71,700 to $6,000, and reclassified the citation from "Willful" to
"Serious." UOSH recognized that, while "the plastic wall anchor pertaining to the cause
of the accident was removed or destroyed while under the control of UPS," the situation
was mitigated by the fact that "UPS provided UOSH with contemporaneous photographs
of the plastic wall anchor at issue, taken during their investigation of the accident shortly
after the accident occurred." Rec. 57-58, 62-63, 1235.
On October 15, 2004, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Skyline, asserting a
wrongful death claim based upon the improper installation of electrical equipment by
Skyline ("Hills 7") Rec. 631-37. The parties engaged in discovery, including third-party
discovery from UPS.
Plaintiffs filed the current complaint against UPS, Skyline, and Liberty Mutual on
August 16, 2005 ("Hills IF). Rec. 1-27. The Hills //Complaint alleges that the
defendants "allowed their own employees, and representatives of the other defendants to
remove and/or alter equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills." Id.fflf42-44; see also id.ffi[34-41, 45-46 (Rec. 76

11). Based on these alleged facts, the Complaint brought three causes of action:
'^^- i ! -

negligence, intentional miscondiK-:. .
aiic^ u

•- d.

*

LMMI.IM-

!

;

' n ihnv causes of actior

i\ proximately caus[ed] the cover-up and spoliation

of evidence and tortiously interfered with the Plaintiffs" right to l.,mg uausis v
resulting from the wrongful vkai

*%

-

'Xi ' l p * ^ c x . 1:>, i /, lUj.

\ \pK nii'd i moiion to dismiss the /////s / / c o m p l a i n t on N o v e m b e r 7. 20*05, a n d
Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss o n N o v e m b e i i-». J u u x iu_\. .v-.v^. O n J a n u a n IJ

uuo.

• • ~ * •« *

:^_.I..

L

, :iled a uo.ss " hum a,n r n - • *>Vt t--i spoliation of evidence.

moved to dismiss Skyline's cross cknm on February 6, 2006, Rec.

^-02- i S UPS argued that a (oil of spoliation was not recognized unuei
Llanii ol spoliation
•

!

VULN

;•

• •< ,.-•

yei demonstrated an inability

v ase in Hills 1 due to the lack of spoliated evidence, and that the exclusive

remedy of Ulah\s Workers' Compensation Act barred piainuj i
. * K * ».. .

oi

u;«-

p . \ al Hansen) held a hearing

regarding the pending motions to dismiss and ordered supplemental briefing. Rec. 459,
1280 supplt mental briefs were filed in December J* !
i >. .J ^ -^

i .».

t-

*«••*- *

er

- -hdate the Hills I and /////s //cases forpurposes

of discovery. Fhat motion was granted by the Hills /court. Rec. 646-49.
Judge Hansen held a telephonic status conieiu
he explainer;

<a: .:•

.»i><

• «i: .»

-

" oiu-u loi his recusal based upon his past

representation of both UPS and Liberty Mutual and having served as co-counsel with
plaintiffs' counsel Edward Moriarity. Kee ; i

7

"f

u

(Rec. 501-63), and Judge Hansen recused himself on February 21, 2007. Rec. 587-89.
The Hills II case was reassigned to Judge Terry Christiansen. Id.
On May 4, 2007, Judge Christiansen stayed a decision on the pending motions to
dismiss pending resolution of Hills /because "[i]t is necessary for Hills I to be resolved
to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills I due to 'Spoliated
Evidence."' Rec. 595-98.
On October 11, 2007, after further discovery, Skyline filed a motion to amend its
answer in Hills I to admit liability. Rec. 712-18. As a result of Skyline's motion to file
an amended answer, UPS filed a motion for protective order on October 18, 2007,
seeking to cancel remaining discovery directed at liability issues, which was no longer
relevant in light of Skyline's admission of liability. Liberty Mutual also filed a motion
for a protective order on the same grounds. Plaintiffs did not oppose either motion for
protective order. Rec. 613-718.
On December 6, 2007, Judge Roth entered an order permitting Skyline to amend
its answer in Hills I to admit liability. Rec. 621-22. Judge Roth also granted the motions
for protective order precluding plaintiffs from taking depositions and discovery on
liability issues, agreeing that the only remaining issues in Hills I related to damages. Rec.
626-29. ("[Bjecause Skyline Electric Co. has decided to admit liability in Hills /,
effectively mooting the Hills II litigation . . . all future discovery shall be limited to
damages issue in Hills I only.").
UPS, joined by the other defendants, filed a motion to dismiss in Hills II in
January 2008. Rec. 613-724. Judge Christiansen held a hearing on the motion to dismiss
8

on March 31, 2008. Rec. 790-91, 1282. At that hearing, Judge Christiansen dismissed
Skyline's cross claim, plaintiffs' negligence claim, and most of plaintiffs' intentional
misconduct and tortious interference claims. The district court determined that Skyline's
admission of liability in Hills /had mooted those claims because plaintiffs could seek
those remedies against Skyline in the damages phase of Hills L Hr'g Tr. 55-56, Mar. 31,
2008 (Rec. 1282).
The district court ordered supplemental briefing on whether to dismiss the
remaining damages claims for intentional misconduct and tortious interference. Id. The
parties briefed these issues and the district court held another oral argument on
September 3, 2008. Rec. 793-1088, 1090-1123, 1142-71, 1181-95, 1281. In a decision
and memorandum issued on September 9, 2008, the district court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss with regard to the remainder of plaintiffs' claims. Rec. 1224-40.
Although the plaintiffs' complaint only alleged "intentional misconduct" and "tortious
interference," the district court determined that plaintiffs "appear to be claiming an
independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence" and that neither "the intentional
nor the negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent tort has been adopted in Utah."
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7, 8 (Rec. 1230-31).
The district court refused to recognize a tort of spoliation of evidence and
characterized plaintiffs' attempts to justify that tort based on Utah precedent—including
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), and Burns v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)-as "a big leap" and "a great
leap," respectively. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6, 8 (Rec. 1229, 1231). The district court also
9

explained that California—the first jurisdiction to recognize a spoliation tort—had
subsequently rejected that tort for both first-party and third-party spoliation. Id. at 7
(Rec. 1230) (citing Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998);
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999)).
The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that, without a tort for spoliation of
evidence, there would be no remedy against the defendants and the alleged spoliation
would not be deterred in the future. Quite to the contrary, the district court explained,
there were a wide range of administrative and criminal penalties in place "to prevent
tampering with evidence." Dist. Ct. Op. at 12 (Rec. 1235). The Utah OSH Act provides
for sanctions of up to $70,000 per violation of the Act and creates a misdemeanor offense
for willful violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-6-307(d). Utah also has general
criminal penalties for destroying evidence, and those criminal penalties are directed at
both employees and employers. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12-13 (Rec. 1235-36). The risk of these
fines and penalties, the district court reasoned, would be a sufficient deterrent and no
additional tort would be necessary. Id.
Even if Utah recognized a tort of spoliation of evidence, the district court
concluded, plaintiffs had not stated a claim for that tort because "[gjeneral tort law
requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages" and
plaintiffs had failed to do so. Id. at 9 (Rec. 1232). "Even viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's recent admission of liability in Hills I clearly
establishes that Plaintiffs are successful" in proving liability in Hills I. Id. at 10 (Rec.
1233). Because the spoliation claim goes to proving liability in Hills /, "Plaintiffs cannot
10

show damages caused by UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts." Id. Damages for the
wrongful death claim "were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death," and defendants'
alleged actions after his death could not affect the damages portion of the Hills I case. Id.
at 10-11 (Rec. 1233-34).
The district court also noted that plaintiffs, at the March 31 hearing, had "made
arguments based upon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand
for jury trial" that defendants' actions during discovery in Hills /"resulted in a chain of
unnecessary legal proceedings by increasing the costs of suit." Id. at 5, n.2 (Rec. 122829 n.2). The district court did not make a ruling on these arguments because they were
not properly raised, but noted that it was "not persuaded that Defendants did anything
more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal process." Id. "If
Defendants had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose," the district court noted, it
would have expected "to see motions to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills /[, but]
no such motions have been filed." Id.
As an alternative ground for its decision, the district court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims for falling within the exclusivity provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.
Id. at 14-15 (Rec. 1237-38). Plaintiffs had argued that the dual capacity doctrine—in
which an employer acts outside its capacity as employer—precluded application of
workers' compensation. The district court noted that Utah had not recognized the dual
capacity doctrine and, even if that doctrine existed under Utah law, "UPS' conduct in its
role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations that are unrelated to
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UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer." Id. at 15 (Rec. 1238). The
district court therefore dismissed the remaining claims and plaintiffs appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To prevail in this appeal, plaintiffs must first convince this Court to adopt two new
theories never before recognized in the State of Utah: a new tort cause of action for
spoliation of evidence and a new exception to workers' compensation exclusivity known
as the dual capacity doctrine. The Court need not reach either of these novel questions,
however, because plaintiffs' complaint fails to satisfy the requisite elements of either
theory.
This Court need not decide whether to recognize a new tort for spoliation, as
liability in the underlying cause of action here {Hills I) has been admitted so plaintiffs, by
their own admission, cannot prove a key element of the tort.
This Court, like most other states, should also not adopt the tort of spoliation
because other remedies sufficiently reduce the risk of spoliation and because the new tort
would create considerable uncertainty regarding the finality of judgment and would
increase the risk of erroneous judgments.
Alternatively, and also dispositive of plaintiffs' claims, the workers' compensation
scheme provides the exclusive remedy in this case. To defeat this well-established
exclusivity rule, plaintiffs would have this Court adopt another new doctrine—the dual
capacity doctrine—that this Court to date has refused to do. Even if this Court were
inclined to make that leap, the dual capacity doctrine would not apply in this case in any
event, as UPS was acting in its role as employer—and not in some other dual, unrelated
12

capacity—during the course of the accident and the post-accident investigation. Plaintiffs
have also not pled the required intent to remove their claims from workers' compensation
exclusivity.
Finally, plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages cannot stand without an underlying
cause of action. In any event, allowing punitive damages against UPS under a spoliation
theory infringes on UPS's federal and state due process rights, because at the time the
alleged conduct occurred, Utah did not recognize a tort for spoliation of evidence.
Allowing plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages to proceed, therefore, would be contrary
to due process.
ARGUMENT
h

PLAINTIFFS' SPOLIATION CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
A.

Skyline's Admission Of Liability In Hills I Means Plaintiffs Cannot
Establish Spoliation.

The district court held that plaintiffs could not establish a spoliation claim, even if
one were recognized in Utah. Dist Ct. Op. at 10 (Rec. 1233). The district court first
determined, under general tort law, that a spoliation tort would require a plaintiff to show,
among other things, that the plaintiff "was unsuccessful [in pursuing a civil action]
because of the absence of the destroyed evidence." Id. at 9 (Rec. 1232) (quoting Mx v.
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2001)). Under plaintiffs' theory of the case, the
alleged spoliation of evidence relating to the cause of the electrical accident prevented
them from proving their case against Skyline. Compl.ffi[53-55 (Rec. 12-13). But
because Skyline had already admitted liability in Hills /, the district court concluded,
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"liability is no longer an issue in Hills I [and] Plaintiffs' legal remedy is not affected by
UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions." DisL Ct. Op. at 10 (Rec. 1233).
Plaintiffs do not directly rebut the district court's conclusion or explain how, in
light of the admission by Skyline in Hills I, they can nonetheless continue to pursue a
spoliation tort. Indeed, in summarizing the case law of other jurisdictions that have
adopted the tort of spoliation, plaintiffs admit that "[t]he two most consistent variables
[for a spoliation tort] are the nature of the duty to preserve evidence and the requirement
of inability to prove the underlying suitr PL Br. 17 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs accurately summarize what other courts have held to be an essential
element of a spoliation claim: that plaintiff was unable to prove his case due to the
spoliated evidence. See e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I DuPont De Neomurs & Co., 341
F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that to prove spoliation claim, plaintiffs "must
demonstrate that [they] were unable to prove [their] underlying action owing to the
unavailability of the evidence") (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
original); Kolanovic v. Gida, 11 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that di prima
facie case for spoliation "cannot be established unless and until the plaintiff has failed to
prove his case without the missing evidence," and recognizing that "[i]f the plaintiff
prevails on his underlying cause of action, there are no damages resulting from the
destruction of the evidence"). Those jurisdictions that recognize spoliation require a
plaintiff to establish a "significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; [ ] a
causal relationship between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the
lawsuit, and [ ] damages." Talmadge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 96-8044,
14

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3114, *12 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 1997) (emphasis added); see also
Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (same under Florida law); Lykins v. Miami Valley Hosp., 811 N.E.2d 124, 147
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (same under Ohio law); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 572
(W. Va. 2003) (same under West Virginia law). Damages from spoliation do not arise,
and a cause of action based on spoliation of evidence cannot exist, unless plaintiffs
demonstrate that they were unable to prove the Hills I case because of the allegedly
spoliated evidence.
Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I completely obviates the need for
plaintiffs to prove liability—it has been admitted—and therefore no spoliation tort can lie
against UPS in Hills II. Plaintiffs' Hills I complaint alleges that Skyline, due to
negligence in conducting electrical work at Hills' worksite several days prior to the
accident, caused Hills' death. To prove that case, plaintiffs would have needed to
demonstrate how Skyline performed its work, how that work was below the applicable
standard of care, and how it caused the death of Mr. Hills. That is how the alleged
spoliated evidence, in plaintiffs' view, might have affected their ability to prove their
case. The need to prove that case is now nonexistent, however, as Skyline has admitted
liability.
The allegedly spoliated evidence related to the cause of the accident, not to
damages, and damages are the only remaining issue to be litigated in Hills I. The district
court therefore properly rejected plaintiffs' analogy to probable expectancy of damages:
"Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable expectancy in damages [because]
15

[e]vidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death." Dist. Ct. Op. at 11
(Rec. 1234). Plaintiffs have come forward with no refutation for the proposition that
damages in a wrongful death action "were fixed at the moment of... death." Id. at 10
(Rec. 1233); see, e.g., Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982) ("It is the loss of
society, love, companionship, protection and affection which usually constitute the heart
of the [wrongful death] action.").
Plaintiffs alternatively seem to claim that they should be entitled to damages based
upon delay in litigation. Plaintiffs dress up this claim in various forms, calling it
"hindrance with a legal cause of action," PL Br. 8, "a protracted obfuscation" and
"obstruction" of plaintiffs' efforts to obtain evidence in Hills /, without citing the
complaint. Id. 11. Plaintiffs also state, without citation to the complaint, that UPS
"delayed and ultimately denied taking of depositions; and impeded access to reports
relative to the fatal electrocution," id. 25, and that "since Liberty Mutual and UPS have
effectively thwarted any discovery in this action, specifics of what was altered and
destroyed have not been fully clarified." Id. 33 n.14 (emphasis added).
The district court dismissed this claim, calling it "a new theory" that was not "in
the Complaint and demand for jury trial" that was "improperly raised in response to a
motion to dismiss." Dist. Ct. Op. at 5-6 n.2 (Rec. 1228-29 n.2). In any event, those
claims are baseless. After reviewing the course of consolidated discovery in the cases,
the district court said it was "not persuaded that Defendants did anything more than
defend their respective interests and participate in the legal process." Id. "If Defendants
had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions
16

to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills L However, no such motions have been
filed in Hills /." Id.1 The district court also noted that plaintiffs "fail to present any case
or statutory law that 'mere delay without other injury is actionable' for intentional
spoliation of evidence." Id. at 11 (Rec. 1234).
Plaintiffs offer no response to the district court's conclusion that their allegation of
delay in litigation or abuse of process had not been pled in the complaint. Holmes Dev.,
LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002) ("A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by
raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment... ."). Moreover, plaintiffs cannot make out a
claim for abuse of process because "[i]f a legal process is used for its proper and intended
purpose, the mere fact that it has some other collateral effect does not constitute abuse of
process." Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 29 (Utah 2003)
1

At the September 3, 2008 hearing before the district court, plaintiffs' counsel
incredibly argued that, while plaintiffs did not file discovery motions because "one of
the things about practicing law out in this area is we do not run to the courts for every
single bit of relief if somebody denies something done," Hr'g Tr. 35, Sept. 3, 2008,
(Rec. 1281), they should instead be permitted to pursue an entirely separate lawsuit to
seek redress for alleged delays in discovery. The district court succinctly rejected this
notion: THE COURT: "I fully adhere to the rules of civility and those sorts of things,
and I agree with what you're saying; but on the other hand, it seems to me that before
you get to a cause of action, you need to use the rules to get the case moving if there
is a delay. Do you follow me? MR. MORIARITY: Oh, I fully follow you. THE
COURT: So again, I just think you're going down the wrong track. If you're going
to argue that they filed motions, and because of those motions this case is delayed,
and therefore you're entitled to damages; I just don't see that, Mr. Moriarity. MR.
MORIARITY: I was not being clear to you, Your Honor. And I understand [that
that's what you're saying]. What I was doing was responding to them saying that I
didn't file protective orders and so I must have agreed with [this]." Id. at 41-42 (Rec.
1281).
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs cite one line from a footnote of an Indiana
opinion for the proposition that "[spoliation damages can likewise be asserted via the
costs incurred by having to adjust one's case to the impact of the spoliator's actions." PL
Br. 26 (citing Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 140 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).
That case has been rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court, supra at 21 n.3, and is not a
correct statement of the law regarding abuse of process because any delay due to a party
utilizing the legal process cannot be a basis for damages. Bennett, 70 P.3d at 29.
In addition, as the district court noted, the claim that UPS somehow delayed
discovery for some improper purpose is patently untrue as demonstrated by the record of
consolidated discovery in the two cases. For example, contrary to plaintiffs' claim that
UPS had thwarted "any" discovery in Hills /, two UPS depositions were taken in April
2005 and, in May and June 2005, UPS produced photos and video footage taken by UPS
during the post-accident inspections. Rec. 989-91, 994-99. In addition, plaintiffs'
counsel twice thanked UPS's counsel for his efforts to have depositions completed and
agreed that delays were not the fault of UPS. See, e.g., Rec. 1005-06 (June 14, 2005
email from plaintiffs' counsel to UPS counsel thanking him for his "thought and hard
work .. . put into getting the depositions rescheduled"); id. 1016-19 (July 28, 2005 email
from plaintiffs' counsel stating to UPS counsel, "I appreciate the efforts you have set
forth in trying to get the depositions set and I know it is not your fault they have not been
taken."). UPS also made efforts to have tangible evidence examined by the Hills I parties
but the Hills I parties could not agree on a protocol for doing so. Id. 848. Finally, when
Skyline admitted liability and UPS and Liberty Mutual moved for protective orders to
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halt any further discovery of their employees because any information they had was not
relevant to damages, plaintiffs did not respond and the district court in Hills I granted the
motions. Id. 851-66. Filing motions that were granted by the court and cooperating in
good faith in discovery simply cannot be grounds for a separate cause of action.
Thus, plaintiffs' complaint simply fails to allege any viable theory of recovery.
B.

Utah Should Not Recognize A Spoliation Tort.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' complaint simply fails to allege the
necessary elements of a spoliation theory of recovery and the Court therefore need not
reach the novel question of whether Utah would recognize such a tort. Summit Water
Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 123 P.3d 437, 452 (Utah 2005) ("Our settled policy is
to avoid giving advisory opinions in regard to issues unnecessary to the resolution of the
claims before us."). Should the Court nonetheless be inclined to examine the question, it
should reject this novel tort in Utah.
As the district court explained, plaintiffs attempt to plead a claim for spoliation of
evidence, a "doctrine [that] has been discussed and sparingly applied in various forms
throughout the United States." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9 (Rec. 1232) (emphasis added). The first
jurisdiction to adopt the tort, California, has now explicitly rejected the tort for both firstparty and third-party spoliation claims. Id. at 7 (Rec. 1230). The district court also
concluded that "[t]he law specifically provides sanctions where [spoliation] occur[s]" in
the form of administrative and criminal penalties. Id. at 12-13 (Rec. 1235-36). Indeed,
the district court noted:
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There was a punishment for UPS' actions, a fine was imposed by Utah
Occupational Safety and Health ("UOSH"), which is the state entity that
investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death
and subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH
imposed a fine against UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's
purview.
Id. at 12 (Rec. 1235).
As plaintiffs fully admit, Utah has not adopted the tort of spoliation of evidence.
See CookAssocs. Inc. v. PCS Sales (USA), Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1357 (D. Utah
2003); Burns v. Cannodale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Most
of the jurisdictions to consider adopting a spoliation tort have refused to do so.2
Although plaintiffs devote significant attention to the different contours of the
spoliation tort in the jurisdictions that have adopted it, PL Br. 14-23, they fail to offer this
Court any reason why the tort should be adopted by this State. To the contrary,
recognizing such a tort is not needed because current sanctions protect against spoliation,

2

See, e.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986); Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior
Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999); Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 A.2d
1247 (Del. 1998); Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. 1998); Gribben v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (lnd. 2005); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc.,
734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997);
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d434,
437 (Minn. 1990); Richardson v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So.2d 821 (Miss. 2003);
Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002); Timber Tech
Engineered Bldg. Prods, v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2002); Elias v.
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Trevino v. Ortega, 969
S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
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it would place unnecessary burdens on the judicial system, and it would risk jury
confusion and inconsistency.3
First and foremost, a tort of spoliation is unnecessary because there are a variety of
other remedies both within and outside the litigation process to significantly reduce the
risk of parties spoliating evidence. For example, a party who has lost or destroyed
evidence is subject to evidentiary sanctions, including unfavorable inferences, striking of
other testimony, and even the entry of a judgment against the party. Utah R. Civ.
P. 37(b); Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 965-66 (Utah 2008);
3

Plaintiffs identify 11 jurisdictions that have some form of a spoliation tort. PL Br. at
16. Defendants are not aware of any other jurisdictions that have recognized a
spoliation tort. Some of those 11 jurisdictions have a more limited application of
spoliation than plaintiffs have implied. Indiana, for example, has refused to recognize
a first-party tort of spoliation, Gribben, 824 N.E.2d at 355. The Indiana Supreme
Court also rejected the case cited by plaintiffs in rejecting a third-party spoliation
claim by an employee against an employer, on the grounds of the problems inherent
in recognizing such a tort and on workers' compensation exclusivity. Glotzbach v.
Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 339-42 (Ind. 2006) (rejecting Thompson v. Owensby, 704
N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (cited in PL Br. 16)). The Supreme Court of Florida
has similarly rejected a first-party spoliation tort, Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
908 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2005), and has not addressed courts of appeals cases recognizing
a third-party tort for spoliation. See, e.g., Townsend v. Conshor, Inc., 832 So.2d 166,
167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (cited in PL Br. at 16). Although Louisiana has
recognized a third-party spoliation claim, some courts have refused to recognize a
negligence spoliation claim, instead requiring a showing that the spoliation was
intentional. See, e.g., Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So.2d 524,
534 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So.2d 922 (La. Ct. App.
2004). New Mexico has also refused to recognize a negligent spoliation claim,
allowing only an intentional spoliation claim. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905
P.2d 185, 189-90 (N.M. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge
Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001). Kansas has also significantly limited the
circumstances under which a party may plead spoliation. Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1183
(rejecting an intentional spoliation tort Cwabsent some independent tort, contract,
agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or special relationship of the parties'').
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Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 517-18. Evidentiary inferences may also apply in the
underlying lawsuit if a third-party spoliator acted at the behest of a party. See Temple
Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 230; see also Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ind.
2006) ("Courts also have the power to issue contempt sanctions against non-parties who
frustrate the discovery process by suppressing or destroying evidence."). And, as the
district court noted, there can be criminal penalties for spoliation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12-13
(Rec. 1235-36). "Regulatory, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions, as well as legislative
measures and sanctions available to litigants within the scope of the original lawsuit,
frequently are of more utility than tort litigation in accomplishing the goals of deterring
and punishing litigation-related misconduct." Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 228; see
also Lucas v. Christiana Skating Center, Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Del. 1998);
Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811,815 (Ky. 1997); Timber Tech Engineered Bldg.
Prods, v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954 (Nev. 2002). Indeed, in the context of a
workplace accident with a product liability component, it may be "in the employer's
interest to preserve evidence that may aid in pursuing [ ] subrogation rights against the
manufacturer." Glotzbach, 854 N.E.2d at 341.
With regard to the facts of this case, additional deterrence for spoliation is found
in the Utah OSH Act, which requires that: "Tools, equipment, materials or other
evidence that might pertain to the cause of such accident shall not be removed or
destroyed until so authorized by the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance
Officers." Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2. Pursuant to its statutory responsibility,
UOSH thoroughly investigated, received and reviewed documents, and evaluated the
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post-accident investigations conducted by UPS. It determined that a citation was
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discourage spoliation and so an additional tort remedy is not necessary.
Recognition of a spoliation tort also raises significant problen is foi the pi oper
fuiiuliuiiiiii* ol 11 it (iiiln i.tl svsdiii In lor example, undermining res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Courts generally do not allow a direct or collateral attack on a
judgment on ti.e lhi>\> that evidence relevani u. me case was falsified, concealed, or
si lppi essed G ?dars-Sinai9 954 P.2d at 516; Wright v. W.E. Callahan Constr. Co., 156
P.2d 710, 711 (I Itah 1945)

Vllowing a tort of spoliation weakens the effectiveness of

tinaijudgments and opens the possibility of ei ldless litigation „ as pai ties aggi le < ' ed b> tl le
o't itcoi tie coi il :i attei npt to look back at their discovery disputes to seek new ways to
challenge the judgment. "Were the rule otherwise, every case would be subject to
constant retrials in tl ic guise of independent actions ' Aw/y/m \ I\*M I I) i // /V/ iterators,
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Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
should be "reluctant to provide disappointed litigants a second opportunity to seek the
compensation they sought in the original lawsuit, even if they seek it against a party not
involved in the original lawsuit." Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 229. "[Rjecognizing
a cause of action for evidence spoliation would create an impermissible layering of
liability and would allow a plaintiff to collaterally attack an unfavorable judgment with a
different factfinder at a later time, in direct opposition to the sound policy of ensuring the
finality of judgments." Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998). The
judicial system's strong interest in concluding litigation and resolving all matters
regarding litigation within each case should lead this Court to conclude that a spoliation
tort should not be adopted.
Plaintiffs' unsupported statements in their brief regarding UPS's conduct during
the course of the Hills land Hills //litigation provide ample evidence of the dangers of
recognizing a tort of spoliation. Notwithstanding the finality of the liability
determination in Hills /, plaintiffs have used further resources in both the district court
and this Court seeking to obtain damages for claims that have already been admitted.
One can only expect that, with the availability of a spoliation tort, many cases could
develop two tracks: the underlying cause of action and the follow-up litigation regarding
potential discovery abuses that one party alleges occurred in the underlying litigation.
The proper forum for such disputes in not a second lawsuit, but is instead the initial court,
where the rules of procedure provide for discovery motions, sanctions motions, and the
like, to address such issues.
24

A spoliation tort also creates significant risk of erroneous liability. "The

compensating spoliation victims, would create the risk of erroneous determinations of
spoliation liability (that is, findings of liability in cases in which availability of the
spoliated ev idei ice vv en ild i lot ha ' e changed tl ie en ltcoi ne of th s i 11 id zi lii lg litigatior i) "
Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 519; see also Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 \ I 2d
349, 355 (Ind. 2005) (agreeing with Cedars-Sinai). Specificah ^ <here are serious doubts
abc i it den ioi isti atii lg that acti lal 1 lai n i 1 \ as si iffered in litigatk

to spoliatioi i Cedars-

Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518. "In such cases, even if the j in y inters from the act of spoliation
that the spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator, there will typically
b<
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i t

would ha\e weighed in the spoliation \ ietim's lavoi " id.: see also Trevino, y<V> S,W.2d
at 953 (A spoliation tort "does not create damages amenable to monetary
\ -

• a-.-:" :-

\ •>

'• -.i-.-i .• • mil iu lake a look within a

case, a tricky proposition at best. Even i\ the spoliation tort was tried along wit; the
underlying cause of action, the presence of the tort raises serious concerns aboi it jiiry
coiifi ision and ii iconsistency, as juries and judges would be determining not only what
had been proven, but speculate what might had been proven had allegedly spoliated
evidence been presented to them...
Plaintiffs discuss the need for a third-party spoliation tort, PL Br. at 18, but ignore
the fad thai "the burdens and costs of recognizing a tort remedy fm th^d party spoliation
are considerate

perhaps even greater than in the case of first pari, ; . •

'

'•

•

2 . 5

Crnty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 231. "To adopt such a tort and place a duty upon an employer
to preserve all possible physical evidence that might somehow be utilized in a third-party
action by an injured employee would place an intolerable burden upon every employer."
Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1182. Adopting a third-party spoliation tort, especially when other
remedies are available, would impose a burden on employers and other potential holders
of evidence that is simply not justified.4
Plaintiffs' reliance on Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah
1982), does not support establishing a spoliation tort in Utah because the tort allowed by
Leigh, intentional interference with economic relations based upon the notion of probable
expectancy, is a concept that applies to traditional commercial relationships and has no
application to the value of a potential court victory. "[U]sing tort law to correct
misconduct arising during litigation raises policy considerations not present in deciding
whether to create tort remedies for harms arising in other contexts/' Cedars-Sinai, 954
P.2d at 515. For example, courts have not allowed civil actions based upon perjury.
Cline v. State, 142 P.3d 127 (Utah 2005) ("The Utah Code provides criminal penalties for
breach of confidentiality of records, child abuse, obstruction of justice, and perjury, but
does not provide for a private right of action for any of those acts. Accordingly, we
refuse to create a private right of action under [these statutory provisions] when the
4

"The risk of erroneous spoliation liability could also impose indirect costs by causing
persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an indefinite period
documents and things of no apparent value solely to avoid the possibility of spoliation
liability if years later those items turn out to have some potential relevance to future
litigation." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 519.
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legislature has not seen fit to do so.") (internal quotations omitted) (altetitdous in
original); see also c < JW . ».

K ^ upon the notion of a

probable expectancy of economic gain, but the expectancy of gain in litigation is a
different type of interest than expectancy of gain during typical UCHIIIIIII c ml i rial i< mslups.
See lempu

i;;,.

. ;<w'

'*

'tii^Ir-s< hvie have been cautious in

definin. tiie interference torts [interference with contract and interference with
prospective economic advantage] to avoid promoting speculam c dinni'.
refusec; to recopw. t.
-

1(j t j i e t o r t t 0

*> •

I Ims

^ <

• * <.• context [and we] also refused to

protect expectancies beyond those involved in ordinary commercial

business dealings—a person's expectancy in the outcome of a jzo\ eminent licensing
proceeding is is ' p o i r e i e d »i;ra111^t oulsnlr interference. *) (internal quotations omitted)
(alterations in original). Simply put, "[a] litigant's expectancy in the outcome of
litigation is peculiarly uncertain, being subject in (lie disueium nl I HUM -UMI |M

lit

Leigh m\ o l u s j a traditional i nmmnvial dispute as one party was scaring a\va\ the
potential business of another party by various commercial tactics, eventually !wicin;j me
plaintiff into bankruptcy. 657 l\2d at 2^ '-M\J. Although OIK i»l the tin'1 • -

** j nung

"d' In> nious ",r', ^iiil < thost suits were aimed at destroying the business, not obtaining a
result from the litigation itself As the district court correctly noted, it w> ik
leap" to use Le/g/i as support for est a'

^

ni^

••*'>. uu not bridge

Other courts that have refused to adopt a spoliation tort have recognized that
court> have ways to remedy problems raised (n spoh inon <»< <1^ Minn'" and lb it there are
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administrative and criminal remedies that address the same issues a spoliation tort would
address. In addition, adopting a spoliation tort would unnecessarily complicate litigation,
making the underlying cause of action merely the opening prelude in a potentially
ongoing fight between the parties about how allegedly spoliated evidence affected the
outcome. The burdens of a spoliation tort, in extending the litigation process, harming
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the doubt as to whether an
unfavorable verdict was indeed due to spoliated evidence, far outweigh the allegedly
additional deterrence a spoliation tort would have in light of the administrative, criminal,
and court-imposed remedies that are already available. Utah should not recognize this
tort.
II.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY BAR APPLIES
Even if this Court were inclined to recognize a tort for spoliation of evidence, and

even if plaintiffs had alleged its essential elements (which they have not), the Court
should nonetheless uphold the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims because of the exclusivity of
Utah's workers' compensation system. An employee's sole remedy (and that of his
heirs) against his employer for events in the workplace is the right to compensation under
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (2005)
("The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all
other civil liability whatsoever . . . ."). "[According to [the statute's] plain language, it is
clear that the [Act] provides the sole, or exclusive, mechanism for recovery when injured
28

employees, or their family members or heirs, attempt to recover compensation foi the
employees' work-relatea :;

-

" / iUinlordlns. Or.

u, IOJ J (Utah 2000).
The district court correctly rejected plaintiffs' claims on the alternative ground (hal
they were Ixu u ^ . ..; v .

\ .1 ^

• \ •• nation Act.

I iT-ii » i - . ai i 4 - o ^Rc^. i^37-38j. iiic district ,oui" rioted that plaintiffs' theory to
avoid exclusivity-—the dual capacity doctrine—had not been recognized in I "l.i'li and llul,,
in any event, the do< IIIIK1 woiild iiol appl-, bivausr "UPS" conduct that is the basis of
i .uus intentional misconduct' and "tortuous interference' causes of action relate to
UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death," Id at IS (idv I » % N i I lie disinci i oui i illinium
stated:
These activities include: conducting its own investigation of the accident
site prior to notifying OSHA or law enforcement; contacting and working
in conceit with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of equipment,
material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent, and/or conceal
their actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in
a light most favorable to Plaintiff UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and
the co-defendants did not generate obligations that are unrelated to UPS'
obligations flowing from its first role as an employer.
/ "l| I hus t*\ HI il thr (lislii'1 mini adoptrd the dual capacity doctrine, it would still
dismiss.
Plaintiffs bring two arguments against (IK appln ahilil , nl <
, i w\x\\ cumpcnsalion
i\» '
capacity doctnne

^uurt should adopt another new doctrine—the dual
and iuk that the workers' compensation exclusivity rule does not

apply because IIPS was acting in a role other th^n -..;».-. -• >•
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accident. Second, plaintiffs contend that the Act does not apply to a tort for intentional
spoliation of evidence.
Even if this Court adopted the dual capacity doctrine as suggested by plaintiffs, it
would not apply to this case. As stated by this Court in Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation:
"the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second role or capacity has generated
obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the company's or individual's first
role as an employer. If the obligations are related, the doctrine is not applicable." 707
P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985). Whatever obligations UPS may have had with respect to
preserving evidence at the site of the Hills' accident, those obligations related to UPS'
role as employer. Utah's OSH Act requires employers to not remove or destroy evidence
that might pertain to the cause of an accident. Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2. To the
extent any duty existed, it was this regulatory duty imposed on UPS in its role as an
employer.5 Indeed, plaintiffs recognize this in their complaint, stating that "[a]U
Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a directive and
obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner, and applicable law to
preserve the premises and material evidence and to protect it against harm, destruction, or
other spoliation." Comp. ^ 59 (Rec. 13). It was "[p]ursuant to those directives,"

5

For this reason, plaintiffs' reliance on Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1273 (1991), is misplaced. Besides relying on the
doctrine of spoliation, which California has now rejected, the employer was the
voluntary caretaker of evidence after the injury. The case discusses no ongoing
statutory requirement to preserve evidence. UPS, on the other hand, was, according
to the complaint, continually subject to the Utah OSH Act requirements.
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according to the plaintiffs' complaint, that UPS committed "to the performance of an
undertaking, to wit, the presei .*.
(Kn

><<..

/,/ ^j 60

i'|.
Plaintiffs' complaint also alleges; "At all times relevant herein, all acts and

omissions set forth herein against Defendants giving M i in ihi , nrtinn were bv
employees .ind ,>r agents of said Defendants and said employees and or agents were
acting \. iihin the scope and i ourse of their employment and or agency u ///. ihp
Defendants, \ -.>ni|

.•*••• cannot allege

' i - -. ^oiib and omissions" were done within the scope and course of employment
and avoid workers' compensation.
Willioul " il.ih'Hi In III , t.idik" <ii i wv in I M ili in in. niher jurisdiction, plaintiffs
now broadly claim that "any citizen" has a duty to preserve evidence. PL. Br. 31. Even
assuming this is correct, it would not serve as a ba>i> u-\ wi\ wking u\.
doctrine here. Ihnyjuim e\|iln'ill\" staled lltal " |l |lie decisive test to determine if the dual
capacity doctrine is invokable is not whether the second function or capacity of the
employer is different and separatefrom,the first." 70 7 P.2d at 680 (en lphasis added)
":•

-

• ar iiu m ^ that because tlie function

of preserving evidence is different than that as acting as Hills' employer, the dm!
capacity doctrine applies.

.•

i (admitting that Htnyham pirn ides a "Yo- - • •
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argument" to their analysis). Instead, UPS's evidence preservation obligation flows from
its role as employer, coming from the Utah OSH Act.6
Plaintiffs' argument should also fail because there is no reason for this Court to
adopt the dual capacity doctrine at all. That doctrine, as used in some other jurisdictions,
provides that workers' compensation may not apply in circumstances when an employer
is acting outside the employer-employee relationship. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893,
898 (Utah 1993). This Court has stressed, however, that the "dual capacity doctrine
directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision" in Utah's Workers' Compensation
Act and the quid pro quo between employees and employers that allows a workers'
compensation system to function. Id. at 899. "The essence of a workers' compensation
system is that it is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and
employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain advantages." Bingham, 101 P.2d
at 679. "[Ejmployees are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault or
being subject to defenses such as the fellow servant rule and employers are protected
from tort suits by employees." Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 899. Adopting plaintiffs' theory
would eviscerate the protections afforded to employers through the bargain in the
Workers' Compensation Act.
Plaintiffs' second argument is that workers' compensation does not apply because
UPS engaged in intentional misconduct. Although an exception applies under the Act if
6

Plaintiffs' reliance on Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985) (PL
Br. at 30-31), is unavailing because that case held that Utah did not recognize the dual
capacity doctrine.
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the employer "directed or intended" the injurious act, this exception does not apply to
I'PS

lirvtwv
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Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct. App. ; V59j Requiring employee to
show that the employer had an "actual deliberate intent to injure" to invoke the
exception);/ h >lfv. C i lex t on I < S I i n, \, 203 P 3< 1 9 6 2 , 9 6 9 ( 1 It; ih 2009) (c sxplaii ringtfo
intent to injure standard). T o the contrary, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that it w a s
Skyline's

injurious conduct. <)oi T T ^ ' s . that caused the accident and M; ; 1;. - •

CompL
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not that it caused deliberate harm. Id. Y\\ 29-31 (Roc. ";
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Now here does plaint*' K

complaint assert that IIPS deliberately directed and intended such negligent conduct by
eel 2v idence to covei i lp its own
culpability in the Hills accident. L die absence of allegations of deliberate intent by
I IPS to cause Mr. Ifills' death, plaintiffs must rely on woikeiV compensation a> :

he

sole i en led/y agaii isl I IPS
riiis case bears a striking resemblance to Glotzbach v. Fro/nan. 854 N.F 2d 33"
(Ind. 2006), in which the Supreme Court of Indiana granted a motion t<
Inr '..puliation

. -.-I

i

I IM id*Mnv Instil npmi workers"1' compensation exclusivity. In that case an

employee accidentally died due to the explosion ol a la 5 •'' at 338. The evidence from
the accident site luui ivcn iiiiown awa\ > me empK \...
.,,.-!•

1 ic decedent's estate

; oi the tank for wrongful death and claims against

the decedent's employer for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence. IJ Th
Supreme Cour* -M Indiana granted the motion to dismiss because '"a;;
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a workplace accident to which the [Workers' Compensation Act] applies has no claim
against the employer for third-party spoliation of evidence." Id. at 339. "[T]he employee
is entitled to workers' compensation, and permitting claims of spoliation by the employee
would open the door to satellite litigation against the employer that the [Workers'
Compensation Act] is designed to foreclose." Id. at 341. The Court should reach the
same conclusion here.
III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED
The district court denied plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages because "[t]here

must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim." Dist. Ct.
Op. at 12 (Rec. 1235). Without a spoliation claim, there could be no damages. Plaintiffs
do not dispute this argument, citing a Utah statute that recognizes that punitive damages
may be assessed only when compensatory damages—due to a cause of action separate
from punitive damages—has been established. See PL Br. 38 (citing Utah Code Ann.
§78B-8-201(l)(a)).
Instead, plaintiffs ask this Court not only to create what they acknowledge would
be a new tort of spoliation in Utah, but to allow punitive damages to apply to the
defendants as well should the plaintiffs prove the necessary elements of punitive
damages. Should this Court decide to create a new tort of spoliation, it should not allow
punitive damages in this case because doing so would raise issues of due process under
the federal and State Constitutions.
"While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is
well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on
34

these awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of giossly excesMw 01 tnlntnu

i puiiislmienl on ;> "orlfrjis"!

Stat* ' •" »

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (20U3), reversing and remanding 65
P.3d 1134 (cited in plaintiffs' brief at 38-39) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see
also 1 Jtal I Const ai t I § / ("'" "I lo pei son si: ial.ll be depi b ' ed of lift libei ty oi pi op ei I:y,
without due process of law."). u [E]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in oui
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
CO''
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State mav impose." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (internal quotation markb omui^d;.
Constitutional ouc process requires that I rPS have notice of the applicability of punitive

admission, should this Court rule in ib la\ or on the spoliation issue, it \\ oukl h, ihc first
time that Utah has recognized that tort Therefore, it would ix fundamentally u-iiair to
impose piniilM

damages foi a ^polialmn loil in this casr because i IPS would lie

punished for conduct that, at the time it occurred, was not subject to punitive damages.
Landgrafv. USIFilm Prods., 51 M [ S
oc :i li conflicts

s
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, , m^ s u. h an mi;, i n : to

• itl i tl ic < li le pi ocess i igl its of I IPS ai id si ion ild be re jected.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UPS requests that the district court's orders be
affirmed.
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